





The major industrial powers abandoned the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates
in March 1973. From a foreign point of view,
the Bretton Woods system had a major disad-
vantage: foreign interest rates moved sympa-
thetically with U.S. interest rates. Studies have
indicated that a 100-basis point (one percent-
age point) change in U.S. short-term interest
rates caused short-term rates in industrialized
countries abroad to change by about 40 basis
points, on average, during that period of fixed
exchange rates.
This interest-ratedependence reflected alack
of monetary-policy independence. For exam-
ple, when U.S. interest rates fell as a result of
monetary expansion, investors had an incen-
tive to purchase foreign securities. Such pur-
chases generated a demand for foreign cur-
rency and anoutflow ofdollars- which foreign
central banks were obliged to purchase to
maintain a fixed exchange rate. The accumu-
lating dollars boosted foreign reserves and,
hence, their money supplies. This tended to
push down foreign interest rates in sympathy
with U.S. rates.
As this example indicates, such interest-rate
dependence made it difficult for countries to
pursue independent monetary courses. The
Bretton Woods system collapsed mainly be-
cause nations were no longer willing to accept
a lack of monetary independence.
The world's financial authorities replaced
BrettonWoods in 1973 with aflexible exchange-
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rate system, mainly because they believed that
this approach would permit a greater inde-
pendence of monetary policies. Theoretically,
with perfectly "clean" floating - that is, with-
out any intervention by central banks in the
exchange market - foreign interest rates
would be completely insulated from U.S.
rates. In practice, however, central banks have
intervened in foreign-exchange markets about
as frequently under the new system as under
the Bretton Woods system. But has "managed
floating" decoupledinterestrates?Thisdepends
not on the amount of intervention per se, but
rather on the relative amount of intervention
in response to interest-rate variations under
the two different systems.
This article examines the impact ofmanaged
floating on the relationship between U.S.
money-market conditions and short-term in-
terest rates in.Belgium, Germany, Switzerland,
France, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Our conclusion is that managed floating gener-
ally has severed short-run linkages between
U.S. and foreign interest rates. The reason
apparently has been reduced exchange-market
intervention in response to variations in inter-
est rates, rather than larger offsetting domes-
tic-monetary operations. Canada and the
United Kingdom are exceptions to this general
pattern, however, because of policies peculiar
to those two countries.I. Interest Rates, Risk, and the Exchange Rate Regime
National interest rates can be linked in the
short run through the impact of international
capital flows on national money supplies. The
tightness ofthis linkage depends upon the sub-
stitutability of the financial assets of different
countries, which in turn is importantly influ-
enced by the exchange-rate regime. In a com-
pletely fixed exchange-rate regime, and with
perfect substitutability of financial assets, na-
tional interest rates would be perfectly linked.
This case provides a useful point of depar-
ture for our analysis. l Consider the impact of
a decline in U.S. interest rates on foreign in-
terest rates. First, lower interest rates in the
U.S. would encourage investors to buy for-
eign, rather than American, securities. As
investors try to obtain the necessary foreign
currency to effect these purchases, the dollar
value of foreign currencies would tend to in-
crease. However, central-bank intervention to
maintain fixed exchange rates, through pur-
chases of dollars and sales of foreign currency,
would expand foreign money supplies until
foreign interest rates fell to equality with U.S.
rates.2 Thus a change in the U.S. interest rate
(ius) precipitates an equivalent change in the
foreign interest rate ( if), or
(1)
Of course assets are not perfectly substitut-
able in practice. But the higher the degree of
substitutability, the stronger may be the link-
age of interest rates between countries. The
financial assets of different countries are im-
perfect substitutes because of (a) economic
and political risk, and (b) exchange-rate risk.
To understand the processes which link na-
tional interest rates in practice, it is necessary
to examine the influence of these factors.
Economic and political risk
Purely economic factors, such as the prob-
ability of default, influence the riskiness of fi-
nancial assets. However, for short-term secu-
rities, economic risk is quantitatively less
important than political risk. 3 Political risk
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arises because of official restrictions on the
flow of capital, either current or prospective.
Prospects of such governmental restrictions
make securities issued in different political ju-
risdictions imperfect substitutes in the eyes of
international investors. Due to the imperfect
substitutability of the securities, an interest-
rate "differential" arises between U.S. and
foreign securities, even in the absence of any
risk of a change in the exchange rate.
The magnitude of this differential depends
upon a number of factors. Obviously the dif-
ferential would change with any change in
investors' perceptions of comparative eco-
nomic or political risk across countries. More
importantly, however, this interest-rate differ-
ential would vary with any change in the rel-
ative supplies of various countries' securities.
If, for example, investors are asked to hold
relatively more foreign securities, the foreign
interest rate would have to rise relative to the
U.S. interest rate, leading to a new differen-
tial. The change is necessary to make investors
content with the shift in the composition of
their security portfolios.
Exchange-rate risk
U.S. and foreign interest rates also may dif-
fer because of exchange-rate risk. This type of
risk enters the picture because an American
investor must (I) obtain foreign currency to
purchase a foreign security and then (2) con-
vert the foreign funds obtained at that secu-
rity's maturity back to dollars. Ifthere is a risk
that the exchange rate will change during the
maturity period, then the American investor
is not assured of a fixed dollar return on'his
investment. The investor can "cover" himself
against this eventuality, however, by contract-
ing to redeem his foreign currency at the cur-
rently quoted dollar price of foreign exchange
in the forward market (F), while purchasing
the needed foreign funds at the spot dollar
price of the foreign currency (S).4
Market forces will work to equalize returns
"covered" for the risk of exchange-rate
changes, except for any differential due toeconomic and political risk. It can be shown
that, in equilibrium
ius = if + fp + d, (2)
where fp = ((F- S)/S)(t/contract period) is the
"forward premium" at an annual rate on a
foreign-exchange contract, and d is the differ-
ential due to economic and political risk. Since
d explains the differential between the U.S.
interest rate and the "covered" return on the
foreign security, it is called the "covered inter-
est differential."5
Thus, in a world where exchange-rate risk
exists in addition to economic and political
risk, changes in the U.S. interest rate are dis-
tributed over three factors: the foreign interest
rate, the forward premium, and the covered
interest differential. That is,
aius = aif + afp + ad.
The questions raised in this paper concern
how changes in U.S. interest rates have been
distributed over these factors. The first is
whether managed floating has led to a decou-
pIing of U.S. and foreign interest rates. That
is, does a change in ius now primarily lead to
changes in fp and d rather than if? Under per-
fectly "clean" floating, we would expect the
money-supply channel that links interest rates
to be completely severed.6 However, this ques-
tion remains open, in view of the large amount
of official intervention in exchange markets in
the post-Bretton Woods system.
Secondly, how is foreign central-bank be-
havior responsible for decoupling interest
rates, assuming this has actually occurred? In-
terest rates could be decoupled either because
foreign central banks have decreased their ex-
change-market intervention in response to
U.S. interest-rate changes or because they
have increased "sterilization" actions designed
to remove foreign influences from their money
supply. Thus, it would be useful to devise an
empirical means of distinguishing between
these two approaches. The distribution of the
effect of a change in ius between changes in fp
and d will provide us with the necessary clue.
II. Foreign Impact of Changes in the U.S. Interest Rate
As we have just seen, changes in the U.S.
interest rate must affect either the foreign in-
terest rate, the forward premium, or the cov-
ered interest differential. The most significant
factors determining the outcome are (1) the
extent of official intervention in the exchange
market and (2) the degree of sterilization of
reserve-flow effects on the foreign monetary
base. Before considering some examples, we
should examine what each of these factors in-
volves.
A foreign central bank's official intervention
in exchange markets - that is, its "support of
the exchange rate" - involves spot-market
purchases or sales of currency. For example,
if the dollar price of a foreign currency tends
to rise above the level desired, the foreign
central bank could sell its currency and buy
dollars. Such actions would tend to drive its
currency's spot dollar price back down. Just as
importantly, however, such intervention causes
the foreign central bank's dollar holdings to
rise. Since these dollars represent a form of
reserves, the foreign economy's monetary base
expands, thereby expanding its money supply
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and depressing its interest rate. It is also im-
portant to note that the foreign central bank
generally holds these additional dollar reserves
in interest-bearing form. Typically, the central
bank uses these dollars to purchase U.S. se-
curities, thereby exchanging non-interest-bear-
ing reserves for interest-bearing reserves. Thus
intervention increases the demand for U.S. se-
curities while also increasing the foreign
money supply.
If the foreign central bank wishes to avoid
having its domestic monetary policy affected
by its intervention activity, it can "sterilize"
the effects of that activity by contracting the
domestic component of reserves by exactly as
much as the intervention has increased the for-
eign component of reserves. The central bank
accomplishes this by selling foreign securities
in its own domestic market - what we would
call open-market operations. This sops up the
undesired liquidity and "sterilizes" the effect
of the intervention. This action, however,
tends to increase the supply of foreign securi-
ties in world markets. 7
With this background in mind, the impact ofchanges in the U.S. interest rate can be ex-
plored under alternative scenarios of foreign
central-bank behavior. The relevant cases are:
(1) no official intervention; (2) support of the
exchange rate with sterilization; (3) support of
the exchange rate without sterilization. These
cases are best analyzed through the use of the
modern theory of forward exchange.s We limit
ourselves here to a heuristic analysis. The ap-
pendix demonstrates the conclusion rigorously
for the interested reader.
Case 1: No official intervention
Consider the impact of a decline in the U.S.
interest rate when there is no attempt by the
foreign central bank to intervene in support of
its currency. First, without intervention, there
is no reason for foreign central-bank reserves
to change. Thus, the foreign money supply and
the foreign interest rate remain unaffected.
Second, without intervention there is no
change in the supplies of U.S. and foreign se-
curities available to private investors - and
no reason for a change in investors' perception
of political and economic risk. Therefore, the
covered interest differential will not change
either.
It follows, then, that the decline in the U.S.
interest rate must only affect the forward pre-
mium on the foreign currency. U.S. investors,
eager to buy foreign securities, must buy for-
eign currency in the spot market and sell it in
the forward market. This bids up the spot ex-
change rate and bids down the forward rate on
the foreign currency, thereby depressing the
forward premium. The forward premium will
fall until covered returns are once more equal.
In Case 1, then, the entire reduction in the
U.S. interest rate is absorbed by a decline in
the forward premium.
Case 2: Exchange-rate support with
sterilization
In this case, the decline in the U.S. interest
rate puts upward pressure on spot foreign cur-
rency as U.S. investors buy foreign currency
as before. But the support operation keeps the
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exchange rate from rising. Moreover, the ster-
ilization action insulates the foreign money
supply and the foreign interest rate from the
impact. However, as noted above, the support
operation typically causes the foreign central
bank to acquire U.S. securities, while sterili-
zation results in an official sale of foreign se-
curities - making U.S. securities scarce rela-
tive to foreign securities in private markets.
Even without a change in investors' risk per-
ceptions, this will cause a reduction in the cov-
ered interest differential, which allows the
change in relative supplies of securities to be
absorbed. In addition, as U.S. investors sell
foreign currency in the forward market to
cover their investments in foreign securities,
the price of forward exchange is driven down,
and the forward premium declines despite the
support of the spot rate.
Thus, in Case 2, the reduction in the U.S.
interest rate is absorbed by both a decline in
the forward premium and a decline in the cov-
ered interest differential.
Case 3: Exchange-rate support with no
sterilization
In this case, the effects of a decline in the
U.S. interest rate are spread over all three
factors. The forward premium changes for the
same reasons as in Case 2. The covered dif-
ferential also changes in the same fashion be-
cause, once again, the foreign central bank's
support operations typically result in an in-
crease in demand for U.S. securities, thereby
affecting the balance of supplies available to
private portfolios. But now the lack of sterili-
zation causes the foreign money supply to be
Table 1
Impact of Dolus
Case 1: No official intervention Doius = Mp
Case 2: Exchange rate supported Doius Mp + Dod
with complete
sterilization abroad
Case 3: Exchange rate supported Doi us = Mp + Dod
without sterilization + Doif
abroadaffected by the support operation. This causes
the foreign interest rate to fall in sympathy
with the U.S. rate.
Case 3, then, is the only one in which the
foreign interest rate is affected.
Implications for empirical analysis
The above cases are summarized in Table 1.
We see that there are two ways in which inter-
est rates could have become decoupled after
Bretton Woods. Decoupling could occur either
because official intervention ceased to be as-
sociated with changes in the U.S. interest rate
(Case 1) or because intervention was accom-
panied by complete sterilization (Case 2). If
lack of intervention were the sole cause of the
decoupling (Case 1), changes in the forward
premium should absorb all of the impact of
changes in U.S. interest rates. In contrast, if
complete sterilization were the sole cause
(Case 2), the impact should be felt in both the
forward premium and the covered interest dif-
ferentiaP





if = foreign interest rate,
fp = forward premium on the foreign
currency,
ius = U.S. interest rate,
D = dummy variable having a value
of one for the Bretton Woods
system and zero for the period of
managed floating,
o = percentage deviation of indus-
. trial production from trend,
CP = rate of change of the consumer-
price index,
e = error term.
In equation (3), the foreign interest rate (if)
depends on domestic and foreign components
of the foreign monetary base, as well as the
foreign demand for money. The exchange rate
regime influences thecomponentsoftheforeign
monetary base, and therefore the foreign
money supply. Variations in the foreign de-
mand for money (relative to supply) are ex-
plained by cyclical variatio~s in output (0) and
inflationary expectations (CP). Expected infla-
tion is measured by a (nine quarter) fourth-
degree polynomial distributed lag on current
and past quarterly changes in the consumer-
price index. The sum ofthe coefficients on this
distributed lag is expected to be positive, but
not necessarily equal to one, as would be true
in the long run in the absence of tax effects.
Equation (3) is used to test if managed float-
ing has decoupled interest rates. A dummy
variable (D) having a value of one during the
(4)
(3)
In this section, we examine empirically the
impact of managed floating on the interest-rate
linkages for six industrialized countries. Our
methodology tests for the direct linkage of in-
terest rates, allowing for two other factors that
may impinge upon foreign interest rates. 10
The first such factor is the cyclical variation
in the demand for money, and hence interest
rates, that occurs over the business cycle. To
measure this influence, we use as a proxy the
percentage deviation of industrial production
from its trend.ll Other things equal, when the
cyclical component of industrial production is
relatively high, the demand for money, and
hence the real interest rate, also tends to be
high. A second factor to consider is the infla-
tion-expectations premium in interest rates. A
major part ofthe movement in foreign interest
rates can be attributed to variations in the in-
flation premium.12 Unless we allow for such var-
iations, measured changes in monetary effects
on interest rates might be spurious and simply
due to common inflationary trends.
The following equations relate U.S. interest
rates to comparable foreign interest rates: 13
if = <l" + aID + a2ius + a3Dius + a40 +
10fixed-exchange-rate period and zero otherwise
is included, both as a multiplicative term on
the U.S. interest rate and as a shift parameter
for the constant term. 14 If a2 is not significantly
different from zero, we may conclude that ius
and if have generally not moved together dur-
ing the floating-rate period. The coefficient on
a3, on the other hand, registers the additional
impact attributable to the fixed-exchange-rate
regime, so that we would expect a3 to be pos-
itive if ius and if were more closely linked dur-
ing that period.
Equation (4), which accounts for the impact
of these same variables on the forward pre-
mium, provides evidence on the reason for a
decoupling of U.S. and foreign interest rates
under managed floating - assuming this has
actually occurred. If the major factor is a lack
of market intervention in response to U.S. in-
terest-rate changes, the forward premium
would change by as much as the U.S. interest
rate, making the value of b2close to one. On
the other hand, if interest-rate linkages were
severed by complete sterilization, changes in
the U.S. interest rate would affect both the
forward premium and the covered interest dif-
Table 2
Impact of U.S. Interest Rate on Foreign Interest Rates
and Forward Premiums on Foreign Currencies
8 •
if = ao + a1 D + a2iUS + a3Dius + a4Q + ~oa5+i cPt - i
8 •
fp bo + b1D + b2iUS + b3Dius + b4Q + l~ob5+i CPt-I
Dependent
Country Variable Estimated Coefficients of Independent Variables
8 8
aoor bo a1 or b1 a2 or b2 a3 or b3 a4 or b4 i_taS+ior i~obs+i S.E. Rho Ow.
Belgium if 5.32 -1.92 .255 .178 .211 .348 .978 .657 1.56***
(1.64)* ( .662) (1.15) (.545) (2.27)** (1.63)* (6.22)***
fp -6.84 4.76 .973 .550 .271 - .488 1.452 1.82***
(-1.77)* (1.67)* (3.32)*** (-1.80)** (-2.84)*** (-2.72)***
Germany if -.973 -6.71 .181 .508 .192 .935 9.14 .982 1.12**
( .150) (-1.60)* (.960) (1.57)* (2.16)** (1.53)* (36.8)***
fp 3.23 -2.49 .748 - .0734 -.211 1.58 1.470 .548 1.74***
(1.05) (-.760) (2.86)*** (- .157) ( 1.67)* (-3.44)*** (4.67)***
Switzerland if 1.79 -1.77 - .0385 .456 .0801 .465 .533 .560 1.78***
(1.40)* (-1.26) (- .324) (2.66)*** (2.02)** (6.64)*** (4.82)***
fp -1.10 4.50 1.01 -.924 .141 - .712 1.112 .610 1.82***
(- .405) (1.49)* (4.03)*** (-2.51)*** (-1.72)** (-4.47)*** (5.50)***
France if 12.5 -7.61 - .196 .843 .0678 - .192 .716 .886 1.55***
(4.44)*** (-2.85)**' ( 1.27) (3.10)*** (2.17)** (-.820) (13.1)***
fp -12.0 8.81 1.21 - .863 .0578 .158 .884* .815 1.34***
(-3.68)*'* (2.82)*** (6.43)**' (-2.58)*** (-14.5)' (.588) (9.66)*'*
Canada if .894 .314 .652 .0833 .0297 .390 .588 .712 1.54***
(.865) (-.160) (6.05)*** (.326) (.427) (3.02)*** (7.24)***
fp -1.26 .368 .480 - .188 .00152 .346 .770 .549 1.82*'*
(-1.15) (.178) (3.45)*** (- .655) ( .0178) (-2.51)*** (4.69)*'*
United if 9.72 -3.49 .195 .0501 - .0741 -.0509 1.265 .884 2.14***
Kingdom (2.07)*' ( .736) (.670) (.108) (-.492) ( .251) (13.5)***
fp -10.7 8.42 .730 .713 .183 .166 2.013 .742 2.08***
(-1.51)* (1.19) (1.53)* (-.970 (.726) (.574) (7.92)***
t-statistics are in parentheses.
••* indicates a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at the one-percent level on the basis of a single-tailed test.
•• indicates significance at the 5-percent level; and * signifies a lO-percent level of significance.
With respect to the Durbin-Watson statistic (D.W.), the absence of significant positive serial correlation in the residuals is
denoted by ••* at the 5-percent level and •• at the 2.5-percent level.
11The periods of fixed and managed floating correspond to
those used in estimating the interest-rate and forward-pre-
mium equations, as described in footnote 14. For a dis-
cussion of this and various alternative measures of inter-
vention, see Suss (1976).
Table 3
Average of Absolute Values of Quarterly
Percent Changes in Official Reserves·
Bretton Woods Managed Floating
'Reserves are denominated in SDR's as tabulated in In-
ternational Financial Statistics. Since world reserves have
been growing over time, this in itself would result in an
observed "use" ofreserves. To correct for this trend effect,
percentage changes in world reserves were subtracted from
corresponding country figures. The formula used to mea-
sure the average absolute percentage change in quarterly










United Kingdom 4.40 12.97
lesser degree of foreign interest-rate depend-
ence on U.S. rates does not depend on the
amount of intervention per se. Rather, it de-
pends on the relative amount of intervention
under the two regimes, in response to varia-
tions in U.S. interest rates and associated in-
cipient capital flows. Because the forward pre-
mium is seen to have changed, on average, by
just about the full amount of the change in the
U.S. interest rate (with hardly any change in
the implied covered interest-rate differential),
we infer that official intervention has ceased to
be associated with interest-sensitive move-
ments of capital.
Interest-rate independence might also occur
if foreign central banks intervened to support
the exchange rate but fully sterilized the im-
pact on foreign money supplies (Case 2). How-
ever, in that case the impact of the change in
the U.S. interest rate would be split between
a change in the forward premium and a change
in the covered differential between interest
rates. Undermanagedfloating, theforward pre-
Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and France
Estimates of these equations for a sample of
six industrialized countries, using ordinary
least squares and a first-degree Cochrane-Or-
cutt adjustment for serial correlation, are
shown in Table 2. The az coefficient is not
significantly different from zero for Belgium,
Germany, Switzerland and France - which
suggests that under managed floating there was
no transmission of U.S. interest rates to those
countries' interest rates through direct mone-
tary effects. Also, the b2 coefficient is not sig-
nificantly different from one, indicating that
with managed floating a change in the U.S. in-
terest rate resulted in nearly an equal move-
ment in the forward premium on the foreign
currency.
On average in these four countries, a 100-
basis-point change in the U.S. interest rate is
estimated to have produced a 99-basis-point
change in the forward premium on the foreign
currency, but only a 5-basis-point change in
the foreign interest rate, and also hardly any
change in the (implied) covered interest dif-
ferential. This result corresponds most closely
to Case 1, in which there is no official inter-
vention in the foreign-exchange market in re-
sponse to incipient capital flows induced by dif-
ferences in interest rates.
The overall magnitude of central-bank in-
tervention has been about as large for these
four countries under managed floating as under
the Bretton Woods regime (Table 3).16 But
whether managed floating has brought about a
ferential, resulting in a value of b2 significantly
below one.IS
The coefficients on the "control" variables,
b4 and bs in equation (4), are expected to be
nearly equal in absolute value to a4 and as in
equation (3), but opposite in sign. Changes in
the foreign de~and for money-as measured
by the Q and CP variables-would affect the
foreign interest rate, and this in turn would
produce opposite changes in the forward pre-
mium. The U.S. interest rate would not be
affected by such variations, because the U.S.
dollar was a reserve currency throughout the
periods of both fixed and floating exchange
rates.
12mium is estimated to have responded by ap-
proximately the full amount of a change in the
U.S. interest rate. Thus a lack of exchange-
market intervention in response to interest
rate variations, rather than sterilization, ap-
parently accounted for most of the interest-
rate insulation for those countries under the
floating-rate regime. 17
In contrast, their insulation from the U.S.
interest rate was far less complete in the period
of fixed exchange rates. The estimated value
of a3, the coefficient on the multiplicative
dummy variable in the interest-rate equation,
is positive in all cases, and significantly so in
all cases but one. Thus, the U.S. interest rate
significantly affected interest rates in these
countries during the Bretton Woods years. The
estimated value of b3, the coefficient on the
multiplicative dummy in the equations explain-
ing the forward premium, is negative for all
these countries, and significantly so in all but
one case. Thus, the impact of U.S. interest
rates on the forward premium of these coun-
tries' currencies was significantly less during
the fixed exchange-rate period, as would be
expected in the case of stronger intervention
in response to interest-induced capital flows.
The four countries' results for the fixed-rate
period correspond most closely to Case 3. Our
estimated responses offoreign interest rates to
the U.S. interest rate, equal to the sums ofthe
a2 and a3 coefficients, are consistent with those
obtained by Herring and Marston (1977). On
average, we find that a 100-basis-point change
in the U.S. rate produced a 55-basis-point
change in the foreign interest rate. In Case 3,
the difference between the changes in U.S.
and foreign interest rates is split between
changes in the forward premium and the cov-
ered interest differential. We find the average
estimated response of the forward premium
for the fixed-rate period, equal to the sum of
the b2and b3coefficients, to be 38 basis points.
The implied change in the covered interest
differential, obtained by subtracting the sum
of the above two values from one, is signifi-
cantly smaller at 7 basis points.
The variables influencing the demand for
money have highly significant effects on for-
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eign interest rates for these four countries,
which suggests the need to consider those vari-
ables when testing for the effect of managed
floating ontheshort-run interdependenceofin-
terest rates. In all four cases, the cyclical com-
ponent of output has significantly positive ef-
fects on the foreign interest rate and significantly
negative impacts on the forward premium.
Similarly, except for France, the measure of
expected inflation significantly and equally af-
fects the foreign interest rate and the forward
premium, but with opposite signs. The sum of
thecoefficients onpastinflationis generally less
than one, as would be anticipated in the short-
run when output and employment are vari-
able.
Canada and the United Kingdom
Canada is an exception to this general pat-
tern of money-market insulation from U.S. in-
terest rates under the managed-float regime.
The estimated a2 coefficient indicates that a
change of 100 basis points in the U.S. short-
term interest rate affected the Canadian short
rate by about 65 basis points even during man-
aged floating. The insignificance ofthe a3 coef-
ficient indicates further that the impact of U.S.
on Canadian interest rates was not very differ-
ent under a fixed exchange-rate system. Simi-
larly, the impact on the forward premium is
estimated to have been about the same under
fixed and floating exchange rates.
Although the Canadian dollar was ostensi-
bly freed to float on the foreign-exchange mar-
ket in May 1970, the Bank of Canada contin-
ued to make the U.S.-Canadian dollar
exchange rate an important policy target, and
it viewed domestic monetary and fiscal policies
as primary instruments for achieving the de-
sired exchange rate.18 However, the target
range for the Canadian dollar turned out to be
a relatively static one, which did not allow for
any significant movement in the exchange
rate.19 Afterfloating in 1970, the Canadian dol-
lar appreciated immediately against the U.S.
dollar by about10 percent, and then remained
in that range throughout most of the decade.
To maintain this exchange rate, Canadian au-
thorities keyed nominal interest rates quiteclosely to U.S. interest rates, continuing the
traditional interest differential in favor of Can-
ada.
Another unique case is the United King-
dom, where interest rates apparently were
fully inslilated from U.S. interest rates during
both the fixed-rate and floating-rate regimes.
The estimated value of the a2 coefficient, mea-
suring the impact of the U.S. interest rate on
the U.K. rate during the managed float, is not
significantly different from zero; and neither
is the value of the a3 coefficient that registers
the difference made by the fixed-exchange-rate
regime.20
The absence of any observable transmission
may be explained by the existence in the
United Kingdom, as in the United States, of
a highly developed short-term market for
credit, which allows the authorities easily to
sterilize the impact of reserve flows on the
money supply and interest rates. Indeed, ster-
ilization occurs almost automatically as a con-
sequence of the normal operation of the Brit-
ish Government's Exchange Equalization
Account. When this Account purchases for-
eign exchange to support the exchange rate, it
obtains the necessary sterling by issuing Treas-
ury bills to the public, thereby preventing a
new injection of bank reserves and deposits
into the monetary system. Similarly, when it
sells foreign exchange it uses the sterling pro-
ceeds to purchase a like amount of Treasury
bills from the market, thereby preventing a
contraction of bank reserves and a tightening
of credit-market conditions.21
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Advocates of a system of flexible exchange
rates, such as the managed floating adopted in
1973, claim that it permits a greater independ-
ence of monetary policies by weakening link-
ages between national interest rates. Varia-
tions in U.S. interest rates affect international
capital flows, which in turn put pressure on ex-
change rates. When exchange rates are sup-
ported by central-bank intervention, as under
the Bretton Woods system, foreign money sup-
plies are affected. Such changes in foreign
money supplies, unless they can be sterilized
by offsetting central-bank action, in turn im-
pact on foreign interest rates.
Quantitatively, central-bank intervention in
exchange markets has been about as large un-
der managed floating as under the Bretton
Woods system. Whether managed floating has
actually weakened interest-rate linkages there-
fore depends upon whether intervention now
offsets the effects on exchange rates induced
by interest-rate differentials to a lesser extent.
It also depends on the extent of utilization of
sterilization policies. This study has analyzed
the question by comparing the linkages be-
tween U.S. and foreign interest rates in six
industrialized countries under the two ex-
change-rate regimes.
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Canada and the United Kingdom were atyp-
ical. In both countries, linkages to U.S. inter-
est rates did not change significantly during the
two exchange-rate regimes, although for dif-
ferent reasons. In Canada, interest rates con-
tinued to be pegged to U.S. interest rates after
theshift tomanagedfloating, simply as a matter
ofpolicy. In contrast, the Bank of England was
both willing and able to prevent any linkage
between U.S. and U.K. interest rates by ster-
ilization operations under both exchange-rate
regimes.
The more typical pattern was exhibited by
Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and France.
For all four of these countries, U.S. interest
rates exerted a strong impact on foreign inter-
est rates under the Bretton Woods system of
fixed exchange rates. A lOO-basis-point (one
percentage point) change in the U.S. short-
term interest rate, on average, produced a 55-
basis-point change in the comparable foreign
interest rate. The results for this period, thus,
conform most closely to Case 3 of our theo-
retical analysis, in which the exchange rate is
supported by central-bank intervention with
little or no sterilization. Case 3 is the only one
in which the foreign interest rate is affected.
In it the difference between the changes inU.S. and foreign interest rates is split between
a change in the forward premium on the for-
eign currency and a change in the covered
interest differential.
Under the Bretton Woods system, a lOO-ba-
sis-point change in the U.S. interest rate pro-
duced, on average in these countries, a 38-
basis-point change in the forward premium re-
quired by the market to provide the forward
cover needed by investors. The average
change in the covered interest differential
needed to induce investors to move their cap-
ital internationally was much smaller, at only
7 basis points. These results indicate that: (1)
In the absence ofexchange-rate risk, securities
in different national markets are fairly close
but not perfect substitutes for one another, and
(2) the elasticity of supply of forward cover to
investors was not very high even in the Bretton
Woods period, suggesting that the market re-
quired a significant risk premium for bearing
the risk ofchange in the exchange rate. 22
In contrast to the Bretton Woods years, dur-
ing the period ofmanaged floating a 100-basis-
point change in the U.S. short-term interest
rate produced a 99-basis-point average change
for the four countries in the forward premium
on the foreign currency, but no significant
change in either the foreign interest rate orthe
covered interest differential. These results for
the period of managed floating correspond to
Case 1 ofour theoretical analysis, where mon-
etary independence flows from an absence of
foreign-exchange market intervention by for-
eign central banks in response to a change in
the U.S. interest rate. Without such exchange-
market intervention, there can be no impact
on foreign money supplies and foreign interest
rates.
In the theoretical Case 2, the exchange rate
is supported in response to a change in the
U.S. interest rate, but monetary independence
flows from sterilization of the impact of inter-
national reserve flows on the foreign money
supply. In Case 2, both the covered interest
differential and the forward premium change
in response to a change in the U.S. interest
rate, while in Case 1only the forward premium
is affected. The general absence ofa significant
response of the covered interest differential to
the U.S. interest rate in the period ofmanaged
floating suggests that sterilization policies were
not the main cause of the observed monetary
independence under this regime.
APPENDIX
Interest Arbitrage in the Modern Theory of Forward Exchange
The modern theory of forward exchange exchange rates. Figures 1 through 3 show the
recognizes that both covered-interest arbitra- supply and demand for the stock of forward
gers and speculators are important forces in commitments in a foreign currency. The ver-
determining the response of the foreign inter- tical axis measures the price of forward ex-
est rate, the forward premium, and the cov- change, and the horizontal axis indicates the
ered interest differential to a change in the stock of forward exchange either supplied or
U.S. rate of interest. As discussed in footnote demanded at a point in time. The spot price
4, uncovered interest arbitrage can be decom- of foreign exchange is initially equal to S in
posed into covered-interest arbitrage and spec- the diagram. To simplify the analysis, we as-
ulative activity in the forward market, and sume initially that the U.S. interest rate and
therefore does not have to be treated sepa- foreign interest rate are equal. We also assume
rately. that, given this condition, tastes and portfolio
We abstract from growth and therefore focus sizes are such that at a forward rate equal to
on short-run equilibrium at a point in time, in the spot rate, there is initially no supply of or
which the total stock of private wealth and demand for forward exchange by investors
supplies of U.S. and foreign securities are hedging against the risk of exchange-rate
given. Conditions of portfolio balance deter- changes.
mine interest rates and the spot and forward
15Arbitragers, who cover their investments
against exchange risk with contracts in the for-
ward market, constitute one side of the market
for forward exchange. If the forward price of
foreign currency declines, given the current
spot rate, covered rates of return on U.S.-dol-
lar-denominated securities exceed those on
foreign-currency-denominated securities; and
arbitragers demand foreign currency forward
to cover additional holdings of dollar-denom-
inated assets. Conversely, if the price of for-
ward exchange rises, assets denominated in
foreign currencies now become more attrac-
tive; and to achieve portfolio equilibrium ar-
bitragers supply foreign currency forward.
Thus, the amount of forward exchange that
arbitragers wish to hold is a downward-sloping
schedule (AA). It is less than infinitely elastic,
because financial assets in different national
markets are imperfect substitutes even when
covered against exchange-rate risk.
Speculators and traders (i.e., importers and
exporters) constitute the other side of the for-
ward market. For simplicity, we initially as-
sume that the value of the future spot rate
expected by traders and speculators, ES, is
equal to the current spot rate, S. Unlike ar-
bitragers, speculators and traders take posi-
tions with respect to exchange-rate risk ~
speculators outright and traders by not cover-
ing commercial commitments. When the for-
ward rate rises above the expected future spot
rate, ES, speculators and traders will supply
foreign currency forward. Since both are to
some extent averse to risk, a higher forward
price of foreign currency, and hence a larger
risk premium, will be required to draw forth
a larger supply. Conversely, when the forward
rate falls below the expected future spot rate,
speculators and traders demand foreign cur-
rency forward. Thus, the amount of forward
exchange made available by speculators and





















Case 1: No Official Intervention
Figure 1
Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy
with No Official Intervention
Figure 1 shows the effect of a change in the
U.S. interest rate with no official intervention
in the spot market. Under the conditions spec-
ified, the initial equilibrium price of forward
exchange is equal to the current spot rate, S.
Now suppose the U.S. interest rate falls be-
cause of either an increase in supply or a de-
crease in demand for money in the United
States. With the spot price of foreign exchange
initially at S, the arbitrage schedule shifts
down to A' by an amount equal to the decline
in the U.S. interest rate. This occurs because,
with a given demand by arbitragers for forward
exchange, the price of forward exchange must
fall by an amount equal to the decline in the
U.S. interest rate, leaving covered returns on
U.S. and foreign-currency-denominated assets
as before. At the intersection of the S&T and
A' schedules, arbitragers desire to shift Q10
assets from the United States to foreign finan-
cial markets. But this incipient capital outflow
puts upward pressure on the spot price of for-
eign exchange, which operates to shift the ar-
bitrage schedule back up.
16For simplicity, we may assume that ex-
change-rate expectations are perfectly inelas-
tic, so that speculators and traders expect an
unchanged spot rate to prevail in the future.
In that case, pressure in the spot market
pushes the spot exchange rate to S" until the
A' schedule returns to its old position. The
spot rate rises by an amount equal to the de-
cline in the U.S. interest rate. The net result
is that, under a fully flexible exchange rate, the
discount on forward exchange becomes suffi-
ciently large to offset the difference in interest
rates, preventing an actual capital outflow. In
terms of the basic equation in the text. ~ius
impacts only on Mp (equals POP I), and not at
all on ~d or ~if'
More realistically, if the future spot rate is
expected to rise, but by less than the change
in the current spot rate, the S&Tschedule then
shifts up as well. However, the new equilib-
riuminvolving higher S&T and A schedules
would still intersect on the vertical axis and
generate the same discount on forward ex-
change as shown in Figure 1, but simply at
higher levels of spot and forward rates. Once
again, ~ius does not impact on ~d or ~if.23
Figure 2
Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy




















Case 2: Exchange Rate Support With Complete Sterilization
Figure 2 shows the impact on the forward- ticity of the A schedule; and the greater the
exchange market of a decline in the U.S. in- certainty about future exchange rates, the
terest rate when the exchange rate is sup- more elastic is the S&T schedule. If the A
ported, and when the foreign central bank schedule is elastic relative to the S&T sched-
sterilizes the effects of international reserve ule, as drawn, then ~ius mostly affects Mp, with
flows on its monetary base by offsetting opera- relatively little impact on ~d. The empirical
tions. The decline in the U.S. interest rate results in the text suggest that these relative
shifts the A schedule down to A' as before.
But now, because of central-bank support op-
erations in the spot market for foreign ex-
change, the incipient capital outflow, 0 10, be-
comes an actuality. The upward pressure on
the spot price induces foreign central banks to
sell foreign exchange in order to maintain the
exchange rate. In addition, when the foreign
central bank sterilizes the effects of this oper-
ation on the foreign money supply, say, by
sales ofsecurities in the foreign money market,
it prevents the foreign interest rate from faIl-
ing.
The net result for the foreign central bank
is an exchange of foreign securities for U.S.
securities. 010 of private capital can flow
abroad even in the short run, with the total
stock of wealth given, because an equal
amount of foreign official capital flows in the
opposite direction. The result in the forward
exchange market is an allocation of the impact
of ~ius on Mp (equals PoPI) and ~d (equals
PIP2), depending upon the degree of substitut-
ability of financial assets and the degree of
exchange-rate certainty. The greater the sub-
stitutability of financial assets in the absence
of exchange-rate risk, the greater is the elas-
17elasticities are indeed a realistic configuration.
But in any case, the forward premium changes
by less than the change in the U.S. interest
rate, which creates a change in the covered
interest differential, ad, inducing investors to
substitute foreign assets for U.S. assets.
Case 3: Exchange Rate Support Without Sterilization
Price of Forward Exchange
S+T
Figure 3
Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy
with Supported Exchange Rate
But No Sterilization
Because national financial assets are not per-
fect substitutes, even in the absence of ex-
change-rate risk, the foreign interest rate does
not decline by as much as the U.S. interest
rate. Thus the arbitrage schedule does not shift
all the way from A'to A, but rather to an
intermediate position A" where a positive
covered interest differential, P1PZ, induces ar-
bitragers to increase their holdings of foreign
assets. Because the increase in the covered
differential is less than in the case where the
monetary effects on the foreign economy are


















Figure 3 shows the impact of a decline in
the U.S. interest rate when the exchange rate
is supported, but the foreign central bank does
not offset the effects of exchange-market in-
tervention on its own money supply. The de-
cline in the U.S. interest rate once again shifts
the A schedule down to AI, resulting in an
incipient capital outflow equal to 0 10. As ar-
bitragers increase their (covered) investment
abroad, however, the foreign interest rate de-
clines because of the increase in the foreign
money supply. The foreign central bank sup-
ports the exchange rate by purchasing an ex-
cess supply of dollars in the spot market and
investing these dollars in U.S. securities. The
arbitragers use the foreign currency that they
purchase from the foreign central bank to bid
up the price of foreign securities and reduce
the yield, until the original holders of the se-
curities are willing to exchange them for the
newly created foreign money. But the decrease
in the foreign interest rate shifts the arbitrage
schedule to A" and consequently reduces the
size of the actual capital outflow to 0 20.
The outflow ofprivate capital can occur even
in the short run, with the total stock of private
wealth given, because an equal amount offor-
eign official capital (the exchange of foreign
moneyfor U.S. securities) flows in the opposite
direction. The relative impacts on afp (POP1)
and ad (P1P2) depend upon the relative elastic-
ities of the A and S&T schedules, with the
impact on Mp (POP1) being greater if the A
schedule is relatively elastic, as drawn. Empir-
ical results in the text for the Bretton Woods
period correspond most closely to this case.
They indicate the existence of a relatively ine-
lastic schedule for the net forward commit-
ments ofspeculators and traders, implying that
speculators and traders require a relatively
large risk premium in order to bear the risk of
exchange-rate changes. 24
18FOOTNOTES
1. This is an instance of perfect capital mobility interna-
tionally. The pioneering treatment of the effects of perfect
capital mobility under different exchange-rate regimes is
contained in a series of papers by Mundell (1968). More
recently, the assumption of perfect capital mobility has
become an important ingredient of the "global monetarist"
approach to international adjustment. See Whitman
(1975).
2. Since the U.S. dollar is a reserve currency, interna-
tional capital flows normally have no impact on the U.S.
money supply. Dollar reserves purchased by foreign cen-
tral banks in exchange-rate support operations are re-
turned to circulation when they are invested in U.S.
money-market instruments. But in the case of adjustment
between two nonreserve-currency countries, reserve
flows woUld reducethemoneysupply and increaseinterest
rates in the home country (where interest rates had orig-
inally fallen) and produce opposite reactions abroad, until
interest levels at home and abroad were equalized.
Moreover, it would be impossible for foreign central banks
to sterilize the impact of capital flows on their money sup-
plies and interest rates through offsetting policies when
financial assets are perfectly substitutable. If foreign cen-
tral banks decrease the domesticcomponent of their mon-
etary bases by sales of securities in the open market, or
by other means, all that would occur is a one-for-one
substitution of the international reserve component for the
domestic component ofthe monetary base, as new capital
outflows from the United States were stimulated.
3. Aliber (1973) has shown that securities issued in the
same political jurisdiction-such as Eurodollar and Euro-
mark deposits in London-show nearly equal returns cov-
ered for exchange-rate risk. In contrast, covered returns
on securities originating in different countries differ from
one another to a larger extent, and also exhibit less co-
variation.
Results similar to those of Aliber (1973) have been ob-
tained by Frankel and Levich (1975) and Minot (1974).
Studies showing less than perfect integration among na-
tional capital markets, even on securities covered for ex-
change-rate risk, include those of Grubel (1966), Stoll
(1965), and Stein (1965).
4. The alternative-holding foreign securities without the
exchange risk being covered in the forward market-is
completely equivalent to holding foreign securities with
the exchange risk covered combined with a simultaneous
and equal speculative holding of a forward contract. Spec-
ulation in the forward market involves the acquisition of
contracts to bUy (sell) foreign exchange at some future
date in the hope that the future spot rate will be higher
(lower) than the current forward rate. When the contract
becomes due, the speculator sells (buys) foreign currency
in the spot market to discharge (obtain) the foreign ex-
change obtained (necessitated) by his forward contract.
Because of this equivalence, the portfolio equilibrium of
American investors can be analyzed completely in terms
of holdings of domestic securities, holdings of foreign se-
curities with exchange risk covered in the foreign market,
and holdings of speculative positions in the market for
forward exchange. A similar analysis also holds for foreign
investors. Therefore, the portfolio position for American
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and foreign investors combined can be analyzed in terms
of the net amount of covered interest arbitrage and the
net size of the speculative positions undertaken by both.
We can easily demonstrate the equivalence of holding
foreign securities without the exchange risk being covered
in the forward market to the combination of holding foreign
securities with the exchange risk covered and a simulta-
neous and equal speculative holding of a forward contract.
Suppose an American investor has $1 to invest in foreign
securities of one year's maturity. Let Sl be the current
price of foreign exchange in the spot market, and S2 be
the price when the foreign security matures. Also let if be
the foreign interest rate and F equal the current price of
foreign exchange in the forward market. If the investor
does not cover his exchange risk by a transaction in the
forward market, the value of his investment in dollars at
maturity equals
Alternatively, the American investor can hedge his invest-
ment against exchange risk by entering into a forward
contract to sell foreign currency to be received at maturity.
The value of his investment in dollars at maturity is





of foreign currency, he will make an additional gain or
loss. The gain or loss is equal to the dollar value in the
spot market of this amount of foreign currency, which he
gets by selling the proceeds from the forward contract,
less the dollar cost of buying this amount of foreign cur-
rency in the forward market.





The total value in dollars of the covered interest-arbitrage
transaction plus the speculative transaction at the maturity
of the security is therefore:
This return is precisely the same as for the uncovered
interest-arbitrage transaction. Thus, uncovered interest
arbitrage can be decomposed into covered interest arbi-
trage and a simultaneous speculative position in the for-
ward market; and there is therefore no need to treat it
separately.
5. The total covered return is actually only approximately
equal to if + fp. For example, the yield, at an annual rate,from covered interest arbitrage on the 90-day securities
used in this study is:
The forward premium (fp), or percent gain (or loss if a
discount) on the spot and forward market transactions, at
an annual rate, is:
(F~S)X4




But this is approximately the same as fp + if' since F
normally has a value close to one. S
6. As has been emphasized by Mundell (1968), even
under a perfectly clean float it is theoretically possible for
interest rates to be linked through money-demand effects,
rather than money-supply effects, if capital continues to
be highly mobile internationally. For example, with a de-
cline in U.S. interest rates, capital tends to flow abroad and
produce an appreciation in the dollar values of foreign
currencies. This appreciation eventually reduces foreign
net exports (and strengthens U.S. net exports), contrib-
uting to a decline in aggregate demand and interest rates
abroad (and to opposite effects in the United States). In
the extreme case of perfect capital mobility, where capital
flows are infinitely sensitive to differences in nominal inter-
est rates (despite the presence of exchange-rate risk),
these movements would continue until interest rates in the
United States and abroad were equalized.
However, Mundell's mechanism for the linking of nominal
interest rates under floating exchange rates is not likely to
be important in practice. First, in the short-run the trade
balance tends to respond perversely to changes in the
exchange rate. (For a summary of the evidence on this
point, see Goldstein and Young (1979).) This "J curve"
effect tends to drive interest rates apart initially, rather
than together, leading to further capital flows and ex-
change-rate movements until investors begin to take into
account an expected future reversal of exchange-rate
movements. Therefore, the response of foreign interest
rates to U.S. rates is not unidirectional. Secondly, over a
longer period differing inflation rates between the United
States and foreign countries produce differential inflation
premiums in interest rates, as well as exchange-rate
movements that tend to maintain approximate purchasing-
powerparity between currencies. Thus, expected changes
in exchange rates-corresponding to inflation differen-
tials-tend to offset differences in nominal interest rates
attributable to inflation premiums, severing any systematic
response of capital flows to differences between nominal
interest rates. The mechanism that is supposed to drive
nominal interest rates together is therefore effectively de-
stroyed. In other words, Mundell's argument has more
applicability to real rates of interest than to nominal ones.
The question of whether national real rates of interest
continue to be closely related under managed floating of
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exchange rates lies outside the scope of this study. How-
ever, for some partial evidence on this question, see How-
ard (1979).
7. A useful analysis of sterilization policies and their ten-
dency to short-circuit the transmission mechanism is
found in Herring and Marson (1977, Ch. 2). Empirical work
in the Same volume, however, shows that sterilization was
not complete under Bretton Woods, leading to some in-
terdependence between U.S. and foreign interest rates.
For more recent work on sterilization policies, see Hick-
man and Schleicher (1978) and Laney (1980).
8. Expositions of the modern theory of forward exchange
include Argy and Hodjera (1973), especially section III;
Grubel(1966); and Stoll (1965).
9. The shift to managed floating could also affect the dis-
tribution Of effects between Mp and ~d under conditions of
exchange-rate support. But this effect is probably not
large. The split between ~fp and M when the exchange
rate is supported depends upon the substitutability be-
tween U.S. and foreign securities relative to the elasticity
of the supply of forward cover from speculators. The will-
ingness of speculators to supply forward cover to interest
arbitragers depends importantly upon the degree of un-
certainty about exchange rates. Even under the Bretton
Woods system, there was a substantial amount of ex-
change-rate risk. The spot rate was allowed to fluctuate by
± 1 percent around the official parity, and official parities
were sometimes changed. Indeed, a recent study by Far-
ber, Roll, and Solnick (1977) concludes that exchange
rates were neither more nor less certain in the Bretton
Woods period. Although exchange-rate changes have oc-
curred with greater frequency under the managed float,
such changes were larger and more unpredictable under
Bretton Woods. Thus, the elasticity of the speculator sup-
ply of forward cover may have been made neither more
nor less elastic by the shift to managed floating.
Governmental controls over capital movements have been
the most important factor affecting substitutability between
domestic and foreign securities. Such controls have been
used undermanagedfloating to help stabilizethe exchange
rate and under the Bretton Woods system to affect re-
serves. It is not clear that either the incidence or threat of
capital controls has generally been any less under man-
aged floating than before. Moreover, in neither case were
capital controls highly effective. So substitutability be-
tween domestic and foreign securities may not have been
importantly affected by the exchange rate-regime either.
10. Previous empirical work on this question generally
has not allowed for the influence of such other factors. For
example, Logue, Salant, and Sweeney (1976) use factor
analysis to measure the degree of covariation in interest
rates among industrialized countries during the fixed ex-
change-rate period. They find that a single factor explains
a fairly high proportion of the covariation in interest rates
across countries. However, factor analysis sheds no light
on the causes of this common variation. It could be due
to events that have impinged more or less simultaneously
on all financial markets, such as common business-cycle
and inflation trends; or it may be the result of the transmis-
sion of interest-rate changes from one country to another
through money-supply channels.
White and Woodbury (1980) extend this type of analysis
to the floating-rate period, and find a significant reductionin the covariation of interest rates associated with the shift
to managed floating. (The main body of their paper com-
pares the covariation in covered interest rates between
the two periods, finding little change. But in footnote 10,
the analysis is applied to uncovered yields on a set of
financial assets in a manner similar to that used by Logue,
Salant, and Sweeney (1976). The result is a significant
reduction in the covariation of interest rates in the period
of managed floating). Since inflation differentials have wid-
ened and become more variable during the period of man-
aged floating, and since nominal interest rates incorporate
inflationary premiums, such a result is not unexpected. But
this result does not necessarily imply a reduction in the
degree of short-run interdependence of interest rates op-
erating directly through money-supply effects. It could be
caused merely by more variable inflation differentials, a
weaker degree of synchronization of national business
cycles, or a combination of the two.
11. The trend level of industrial production was calculated
recursively by multiplying last quarter's trend level by the
actual rate of growth over the previous 20 quarters. Thus,
the trend in period t of industrial production is:
P, = PH (1 +R,) where R, = '\! P,IP'n 20 -1, and P, = P,
for the first observation. The source of the quarterly data
on industrial production was the IMF's International Fi-
nancial Statistics.
12. Recent work in this area suggests that, in the post-
World War II period, inflationary expectations generally
have adjusted relatively rapidly to inflation actually experi-
enced. In the United States, for example, inflation expected
by money-market participants appears to be mainly a
function of actual inflation over the previous eight quarters.
A similar formulation is used here to account for the var-
iation in expected inflation, and henceinflation premiums, in
foreign interest rates. A representative study for the United
States is Yohe and Karnosky (1969). The consumer-price
index was used as the measure of inflation, and the source
of quarterly changes in this index was the IMF's Inter-
national Financial Statistics.
13. The interest rates used are 3-month representative
money-market rates for all countries except Switzerland,
where the bank time-deposit rate is used instead. Quart-
erly averages were calculated from end-of-month data.
The data source is Morgan Guaranty Trust's World Fi-
nancial Markets. The 3-month forward premium was cal-
culated on an annual-rate basis as a quarterly average
from end-of-month data on spot and forward rates, as
compiled by the International Monetary Fund. The data
were obtained from the Chase Econometrics data bank
covering various issues of the IMF's International Finan-
cial Statistics.
14. For all countries in the sample except Canada, the
fixed exchange-rate period is 1966-1 through 1971-1, and
the period covering the managed float is 1973-111 through
1978-1V. Canada floated earlier, and its respective periods
are 1966-1 through 1970-1 and 1970-111 through 1978-1V.
We experimented with additional dummy variables to ac-
count for variations in the forward premium and foreign
interest rates caused by expectations of devaluation or
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revaluation during the fixed-rate period. Only in the case
of the U.K. did such a speculative dummy variable register
a significant effect, and then only for the quarter of the
1967 devaluation. Rather than entering a dummy variable
to help explain behavior for this one quarter, that obser-
vation was simply dropped from the U.K. sample.
15. It might be objected that with an infinite elasticity of
interest arbitrage with respect to the covered interest dif-
ferential, Ad would equal zero; and Afp, and therefore b2,
would equal one in this case also. But to anticipate the
empirical results, the evidence for the Bretton Woods pe-
riod indicates that Ad is smaller than Mp when exchange
rates are supported, but that it is still large enough to
distinguish between the two hypotheses. If it could be
assumed that the Bretton Woods period constituted a pure
combination of Cases 2 and 3, then the evidence from the
period would suggest that if interest rates had been com-
pletely decoupled under managed floating solely because
of complete sterilization (Case 2), Afp, and hence b2, would
equal only .84 on average. But, since the Bretton Woods
period contains an admixture of Case 1, due to floating of
the exchange rate between intervention points, this esti-
mate of .84 is really only an upper bound; and we would
expect the observed value of b2 to be lower than that if
there were complete sterilization.
16. Since exchange-rate variability has indeed increased
very significantly under managed floating, this may at first
seem surprising. But shocks to the system, particularly
those associated with the oil crisis, may well have been
larger in the period of managed floating. In addition, the
view that there is necessarily a trade-off between ex-
change-rate changes and reserve changes rests on as-
sumptions that 1) speculative behavior in the foreign-ex-
change market is independent of the exchange-rate
regime, and 2) the exchange market is stable in the short-
to medium-run. Neither assumption is necessarily tenable.
For stability to occur, the excess demand for foreign ex-
change must fall (rise) as the exchange rate rises (falls).
But "J curve" effects on the current account assure that
this will not be true in the short run unless speculation is
stabilizing within the relevant range. With a locally unsta-
ble market, movements in the exchange rate increase the
size of any gap between the demand and supply for for-
eign currency, increasing the use of reserves for authori-
ties who intervene in order to resist such exchange-rate
fluctuations. For a detailed treatment of these points, see
Williamson (1976).
17. Thus, a 100 basis-point change in the U.S. interest
rate, on average, actually produced a 99 basis-point
change in the forward premium on the foreign currency
under managed floating, compared to the less than 84
basis-point change that likely would have resulted from
the Case 2 model of complete sterilization (see footnote
15). These point estimates strongly suggest that the in-
sulation of these foreign interest rates under managed
floating was mainly due to an absence of exchange-market
intervention in response to changes in the U.S. interest
rate. However, the standard errors of the estimated coef-
ficients are not low enough to allow one to reject with a
high degree of certainty the alternative hypothesis of com-
plete sterilization.
18. The Annual Report of the Bank of Canada (1970, p.
9) clearly states this orientation:The exchange rate is a very important price in
a country that trades with the outside world on
the scale that Canada does.... It is not there-
fore possible to ignore it, even when it floats.
Public financial management must continue to
be concerned that the exchange rate is broadly
suitable to the development of Canada's inter-
national trade, and compatible with the desired
structure of our balance of payments, in partic-
ular the size of the balance on current account.
It is therefore still necessary to seek a mix of
fiscal and monetary policy which encourages
levels of interest rates in Canada that are con-
sistent with the exchange rate staying within a
suitable range.
19. For more extended treatments of this point, see Pe-
sandra and Smith (1973) and Courchene (1976). Toward
the end of 1975, the Bank of Canada announced an ap-
parently radical change in monetary policy. Instead of in-
terest rates, the focus of policy henceforth would be the
behavior of a monetary aggregate; and policy would be
geared to a gradual lowering of the inflation rate. But in
practice, interest rates were chosen as the policy instru-
ment for controlling money, and on certain occasions were
explicitly used to defend the exchange rate. The econo-
metric results presented here suggest that actual policy
remained much the same, despite the change in rhetoric.
See also Howitt and Laidler (1980).
20. In contrast, the estimated coefficient on the multipli-
cative dummy variable, b3, though not significantly differ-
ent from zero, is about equal in magnitude but opposite
in sign to the estimated response, b2, of the forward pre-
mium to the U.S. interest rate in the period of managed
floating. This suggests a smaller impact on the forward
premium under fixed exchange rates. However, the rea-
son in this case is different than it is for the other four
countries. The explanation apparently is the heavy inter-
vention in the forward exchange market undertaken by
the Bank of England early in the fixed exchange-rate pe-
riod, rather than an increased response of the U.K. interest
rate to the U.S. interest rate. The fact that the forward rate
was supported by the Bank of England over only a portion
of our fixed exchange-rate period (up until the 1967 de-
valuation) likely accounts for the lack of statistical signifi-
cance in the observed shift in the impact of the U.S.
interest rate on the forward premium. Chalmers (1971)
provides a collection of papers detailing this period of
forward-exchange intervention by the Bank of England.
21. Hodgman (1974, p. 173) describes the operation of
the Exchange Equalization account.
22. Another recent attempt at measuring risk premiums
in the forward exchange market is Stockman (1978). His
findings suggest that significant risk premiums exist for
those taking open positions, but that they are probably not
constant. This result is consistent with both the modern
theory of forward exchange outlined in the appendix and
our empirical results. See also Froewiss (1977).
23. The above analysis assumes that the decline in the
U.S. interest rate is a change in the "real" rate, and is
unaccompanied by a change in inflationary expectations
22
that might affect the expected future spot rate, ES. But
since a major part of the movement in U.S. interest rates
during the period examined can be attributed to variations
in inflationary premiums, we should consider the case of a
decline in the nominal U.S. interest rate that is due to
lower inflationary expectations. However, the distribution of
this impact of ~ius on Mp, ~d, and ~if when there is no
official spot-market intervention turns out to be the same
as when the change in the U.S. interest rate is due to a
change in the real rate.
If the U.S. interest rate declines because of lower infla-
tionary expectations, in a situation (such as managed
floating) where there are no official parities for the spot
rate, speculators and traders might expect the future spot
rate to fall according to the well known principle of pur-
chasing-power parity. In Figure 1, the initial downward
shift in the A schedule would be accompanied by an equal
downward shift in the S+T schedule (due to the change
in the expected spot rate, ES). The new equilibrium would
occur at the same quantity as initially (at 0); and ~fp would
be equal to ~ius' leaving no impact on ~d or ~if - as is
also true in the case of a "real" rate decline.
However, two differences can be cited. When the U.S.
interest rate declines purely because of lower inflationary
expectations, the decline in the forward premium is pro-
duced solely by a decline in the forward rate, with the spot
rate given. Whereas when that decline is a "real" change,
the reduction in the forward premium tends to be produced
by an increase in the spot rate. Secondly, when the decline
in the U.S. interest rate is only nominal, arbitragers have
no incentive to move their capital abroad. But with a "real"
decline in the U.S. interest rate, there is an incipient capital
outflow, which then turns the forward premium against ar-
bitragers. Nevertheless, no matter which kind of change
occurs in the U.S. interest rate, an equal change in the
forward premium indicates a lack of official intervention in
the spot market.
24. If the decline in the U.S. interest rate were due to
lower inflationary expectations, the S+T schedule might
shift downward as described in footnote 23, to reflect a
decline in the expected future spot rate based on pur-
chasing-power parity. Then the relative impacts on ~fp and
M would no longer be determined soley by the relative
elasticities of the A and S+T schedules.. However, this
probably did not occur to any significant extent in the
Bretton Woods period.
To be sure, changes in the U.S. interest rate were partly
only nominal, and not "real". But it is unlikely that changes
in the inflation premium in U.S. interest rates were signifi-
cantly associated with concurrent changes in expected
future spot rates under the Bretton Woods system. For in
that system, anticipations of speculators and traders were
conditioned more by the likelihood of imminent changes
in official parities, which in turn depended on such things
as the size of international reserve holdings and political
factors, than by current changes in purchasing-power par-
ity. Consequently, the relative impacts on ~fp and~d esti-
mated for the Bretton Woods period would appear to be
indicative of the actual relative elasticities of the A and
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